מינויים, הענקת דרגות וחילופי תפקידים. יולי 2009 עד אוק' 2011

The 2018 Bomber: THE CASE FOR ACCELERATING THE NEXT GENERATION LONG-RANGE STRIKE SYSTEM

http://www.northropgrumman.com/anal..._case_for_a.pdf

בגדול הטיעונים של גרומן לטובת המפציץ הם שילוב של הקיטון בסד"כ חהא"א, הגידול בטווחים הנדרשים, התעצמות איום הטק"א המודרני והצורך לשאת פצצות גדולות יותר על מנת להשמיד מטרות ממוגנות /תת-קרקעיות יצריך בסופו של דבר מפציץ חדש ארוך טווח בעל יכולות ניכרות בתחום החדירה, ל"א והטלת חימוש מדויק.

In 2006, the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded that the Air Force should accelerate the fielding of its Next Generation Long-Range Strike System (NGLRS) from 2037 to 2018. This paper inquires into the rationale behind that decision.

Operating in theaters where U.S. base access declined from 37 airfields per million
square miles, as the U.S. experienced during the Cold War, to 15 airfields per million
square miles along the Asian-Pacific rim. U.S. air forces will be expected to operate overgreater ranges than required in the past.
· Operating against hostile nations capable of fielding more effective anti-access offensive weapon systems, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, of increasingly greater accuracy and effect, and potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction. In addition,
defensive weapons systems are proliferating—in the form of sophisticated SA-10,
SA-12 and SA-20 surface-to-air missile systems and advanced fighter aircraft. These
capabilities limit the ability of the United States to deploy short-range forces to the
region, and to operate them from allied bases.
· Operating with a reduced fighter inventory. Future Joint Force Air Component
Commanders can expect more restrained resources to execute an air campaign, resulting potentially in fewer targets struck. When required to operate at further distances, the reduced fighter fleet will not generate the sorties required to support the typical joint
campaign during major combat operations

הסיבות שבגינן חהא"א לא יזם פיתוח מפציץ חדש ב 30 השנים האחרונות

· No significant combat attrition

If the lack of an increased threat was one factor contributing to delaying bomber modernization, so was the requirement for a more advanced system. Thus, in 2001, the opportunity to acquire a conventional variant of the B-2 bomber was set aside on the grounds that the “B-2C” did not offer enough new capability. The Air Force wanted an
aircraft “…that is extremely stealthy, has extreme high-speed and extreme range, allowing us to conduct wholesale daytime operations. [We need to] reduce the link between when the target is spotted and identified, and it is attacked.”

A second reason the Air Force chose to postpone a new bomber was the priority it placed on modernizing its air superiority (F-22) force. The Air Force outlined several factors underpinning the F-22’s urgency, including how the F-15C would reach its
8,000 hour airframe life by 2010. In addition, the Air Force argued that Russian, French and Chinese fighters would surpass the F-15’s capabilities early in the 21st Century—requiring a more capable fighter aircraft to ensure U.S. air dominance. Given the primacy of that threat and constrained procurement budgets, the Air Force elected to push the F-22 program and hold to the 2037 timeline for the next advanced technology bomber

המשמעות של העדר בסיסים מספיקים מחייבת לפעול בטווחים מוגדלים ומגדילה התלות של מטוסי תקיפה בצי עצום של מתדלקים

Table 1 depicts a notional deployed force to support major combat operations near Taiwan when bases in Korea or Japan are denied. Five hundred air-to-ground fighter aircraft would require nearly 300 tanker aircraft.

לגבי התעצמות איום הטק"א המתקדמים - הדאבל דיגיט הרוסים -

Air Force leaders observed during Operation ALLIED FORCE that B-1Bs and other nonstealthy aircraft could not survive in the face of “double digit SAMs,” even when employing advanced decoys and other countermeasures.

These anti-aircraft missile systems are proliferating throughout the Middle East and Asia China is purchasing 14 to 20 battalions of Russian S-300 SAMs, allowing that nation to field 700-1,000 missiles capable of denying air operations over the Taiwan Straits to nonstealthy aircraft. More than eight nations also have the SA-10, a system similar to the SA-20 with a maximum range of 125 miles. Air defense missile systems
with these ranges will push U.S. aircraft further away, reduce the effectiveness o
U.S. stand-off air launched cruise missiles and deny U.S. access to their air space.

In addition, more advanced air defense fighters are being fielded. Russian-made Su-27, Su-30 and Su-37 interceptors rival the capabilities of most of the U.S. fighter fleet. The Su-37, equipped with a phased array, multi-function radar and advanced counter measures, will operate at a combat radius of nearly 1,000 miles and contest U.S. air זsupremacy.Russia and China are also developing the FA-PAK and J-XX aircraft series, designed to challenge the F-22’s stealth, avionics and super-cruise capabilities and further deny the U.S. access in their airspace. If patterns of proliferation continue,
these advanced aircraft will soon make their way into the inventories of other
nations.

קיצוץ בסד"כ חה"א בכל סוגי המטוסים לעומת היכולת של מפציצים לשאת ולהטיל כמויות עצומות של חמ"מ

A planned reduction in the bomber fleet will also aggravate the targeting shortfall. The USAF has proposed retiring 38 B-52s by the end of fiscal year 2008 in order to save $680 million in operations and maintenance costs through 2011. Given the fiscal pressures on the service and the cost of an aging fleet, additional force structure cuts are not out of the question. In terms of aimpoints, the proposed B-52 drawdown represents a loss of 638
targets that could be struck with JDAMs or 760 targets hit with air-launched cruise missiles

Will this shortfall matter? During the six weeks of Operation DESERT STORM, U.S. forces attacked 40,000 targets. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM’s three weeks of major combat operations, the air component engaged 19,000 targets. These two campaigns reflect an average of 950 targets per day. Thus, the capacity appears to be sufficient for future potential requirements. Three factors, however, highlight the significance of the reduced ability to hit targets and why the total capacity may be insufficient. First, the U.S. deploys only half its combat air forces for a single campaign,
with the rest of the force committed to other missions. Second, a number of the deployed F-22 and F-35s will be diverted from air-to-ground missions to gain air superiority. Finally, air campaign planners want to strike the most number of targets as quickly as possible to maximize the effects.

While bombers have consistently flown a small percentage of total combat sorties, the integration of low cost, direct attack weapons such as JDAM enabled a large number of targets to be attacked on a single sortie. Against Serbia during Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999, a handful of bombers delivered over 50 percent of the total number of
weapons. The B-2, equipped with an early version of the JDAM, flew just three percent of the sorties while hitting 33 percent of the targets in the first eight weeks of operations. In a similar manner, during the first six months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, bombers flew 10 percent of the missions against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, but employed 70 percent of all weapons—including 46 percent of all precision munitions. Likewise, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, bombers were a small percent of the sorties—just 3 percent—but employed nearly 55 percent of all Air Force weapons.

שיקול נוסף - ביצור המטרות והכנסתן למעמקי האדמה מצריך פצצות גדולות יותר, שרק מפציצים יכולים לשאת, בטח בטווחים ובמספרים הנדרשים בשדה הקרב העתידי

Finally, the targeting dilemma is accentuated by adversaries investing in hardened and deeply buried facilities to protect key military infrastructure (such as command posts or weapons storage bunkers.Few aircraft can carry the weapons required to penetrate and destroy these targets. An F-15E can only carry a single large penetrator—the 5,000 lb GBU-28 capable of penetrating 100 feet of dirt or 20 feet of concrete.The B-2 can carry
eight GBU-28s. In addition, only the B-2 can carry the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) featuring eight times theexplosive payload and three times the penetrating capability of the GBU-28. Thus, in the near future, a JFACC will likely face a
situation where the air component will have fewer assets that can survive deep in hostile airspace and limited options for engaging well-protected facilities. While the NGLRS may or may not carry weapons the size of MOP, its capabilities as a survivable, penetrating and long-range strike system will mitigate this shortfall.

יתרון חשוב נוסף של המטוס המתקדם והמתוקשב הזה הן המערכות המתקדמות שישא המדמות ומייתרות יכולות של מטוסים כגון AWACS, JSTARS וכ' ומאפשרות לו לפעול במתארים בהם האויב תוקף/מגן סייברית כלפי משאבי פיקוד ותכנון אמריקנים ואף לבצע התקפות סייבר משלו.

Second, the NGLRS will be built with flexibility to handle dynamic conventional requirements—such as re-tasking in-flight needed to support TST operations. The NGLRS will be designed as part of a netted Command and Control, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C 2 ISR) enterprise. Dynamic re-tasking has become the cornerstone of Air Force operations since the 1991 Gulf War, when adversaries began moving assets to reduce their vulnerability to U.S. aerial attack. To overcome this tactic, the U.S. has linked ISR assets in a network connecting command and control nodes with loitering attack aircraft capable of responding rapidly to time-sensitive targeting information.

ההמלצה האובייקטיבית לחלוטין של גרומן היא שרכש של 80-100 מפציצים כאלו יתן בידי נשיא עתידי של ארה"ב את היכולת לנהל מלחמה כנגד אירן/צפון קוריאה/סין באותה אפקטיביות ואינטנסיביות בה נוהלו מלחמות המפרץ, קוסובו ועירק ואף מעבר לכך.

A fleet of 80-100 NGLRS systems will provide a capability to support such sustained operations over a period of months, if needed. If U.S. forces were simultaneously engaged in a conventional theater conflict, such as ALLIED FORCE or ENDURING FREEDOM, the larger long-range strike inventory provides a strategic reserve—providing the President options not available with the current inventory.

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