ה IDA הוא מלכ"ר במימון פדרלי היושב בסמוך לוושינגטון DC ומפעיל שלשה מרכזי מחקר, שאחד מהם מתמחה צו"ב

https://www.ida.org/upload/research...ter12-13-2w.pdf

https://www.google.co.il/url?sa=t&r...F55x5iJEO8-XUkA

שימו לב לא פחות מ 375 מסוקים אבדו לאמריקנים בתאונות והפלות ב 8 השנים הראשונות למלחמות. בויאטנם אבדו לאמריקנים למעלה מ 2000 מסוקים רק מפעילות אויב! בהנחה שהקצב השנתי הוא 45 ומאידך קצב הפעילות התמתן עם הנסיגה מעירק וצמצום הפעילות באפגניסטן אפשר להעריך שסך האבדות במלחמות המאה ה-21 עומד על כ 450 מסוקים. שימו לב שהחיילים שנהרגו בתאונות והפלות המסוקים מהווים כ 5%~ מסך הרוגי מלחמת ויאטנם ו ~8% מסך הרוגי מלחמות המאה ה-21, נתון גבוה מאד.


During Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF), there were 375 rotorcraft losses with 496 fatalities from October 2001 to September 2009. Mishaps accounted for 81 percent of all losses with combat losses (i.e., aircraft shoot downs) accounting for the remaining 19 percent; 73 percent of the fatalities occurred in a combat theater. The OEF/OIF combat hostile action loss rate is seven times lower than Vietnam. Aircraft vulnerability reduction design and tactics have mitigated the losses. Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and Rocket Propelled Grenades
(RPG)/rockets account for most of the rotorcraft combat hostile action losses in OEF /OIF. The combined mishap loss rate (both combat non-hostile and non-combat) was 2.71 losses per 100,000 flight hours, slightly exceeding the loss rate due to combat hostile action. The in-theater mishap loss rate was ten times worse, and the out-of-theater loss rate was four times worse than the Congressional and SECDEF goal of 0.5 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. Loss of situational awareness and other human factors accounted for more than 79 percent of the losses of airframe and fatalities. The primary causal
factors are controlled flight into terrain and brownout.

עמידות המסוקים כפקטור אחד

The winning aircraft for the UTTAS program was the UH-60, and for the AAH program, it was the AH-64. Both aircraft had extensive vulnerability reduction programs, and these two aircraft flew 60 percent of all rotary wing combat flight hours in OEF/OIF.

הגדלת נפח הפעילות בלילה כפקטור נוסף

During Vietnam, there was a distinct difference between the loss rates for attack/ observation helicopters (pilots and observers only) and cargo/utility helicopters (capable of carrying passengers) with the attack/observation helicopters having a combat hostile action loss rate about twice that of cargo/utility helicopters. Table 3 shows that when
only attack and observation helicopters are compared, the OEF/OIF loss rate is nearly ten
times lower, and the fatality rate is nine times lower than Vietnam. Thus, nearly all of the Vietnam losses occurred in daylight or twilight hours when the enemy might have had an opportunity to visually acquire the aircraft before firing his weapon. In OEF/OIF, most helicopters were equipped with night vision devices, and night flights were routine. These more frequent night flights limited the enemy’s ability to visually acquire the helicopter before engaging it. Validation of this point is seen in the fact that 75 percent of the combat hostile action losses in OEF/OIF occurred during daylight or twilight hours, which shows that visual identification is one of the primary methods for the enemy to acquire low flying rotary wing aircraft.

שימו לב שיחס ההרוגים באובדן מסוקים הוא כמעט כפול (!) מאשר בויאטנם וזאת עקב השימוש הרב שעושים המקומיים ברקטות, טזק"א וכו' ושמוביל בהכרח לאובדן המסוק על כל צוותו ותכולתו.

Fatality rates for both conflicts are higher for cargo/utility helicopters primarily because of the higher number of occupants on each flight. In Vietnam, the fatality to loss ratio for cargo/utility helicopters was 1.85, but in OEF/OIF, the ratio increased to 3.2. Because of the extensive vulnerability reduction programs on helicopters designed since Vietnam, more lethal threats such as Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS), Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), and rockets caused far more fatalities per loss.


Another key enabler is the development of advanced flight controls systems which includes fly-by-wire technology and modern control laws that affect rotorcraft handling
qualities. With the exception of the V-22 Osprey and the proposed CH-53K, the DoD rotorcraft fleet will continue to use legacy hydro-mechanical flight control systems for the foreseeable future. Although TACAIR has not fully realized the benefit of reduced mishap rates with fly-by-wire, application to rotary wing should be considered primarily for the improvement in rotorcraft handling qualities that could benefit combat survivability and operational effectiveness.






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