Q. In Gaza, your forces executed more than 6,000 manned, unmanned and gunship sorties, most of them precision strikes. Has that prepared you for high-risk, strategic operations, such as an attack on Iran's dispersed, concealed and heavily fortified nuclear weapons facilities?

A. There's no direct connection between the Gaza operation and longer-range operations of the future. In Cast Lead [Israel's code name for the combat in Gaza from Dec. 27, 2008, to Jan. 18, 2009], we had to adapt air power capabilities to a very narrow, dense and difficult geographic theater. That specific scenario - as with all scenarios, including the longer-range one you mentioned - demanded tailoring of assets, capabilities and knowledge to suit the mission.

Q. Such as?

A. Operating in Gaza against an elusive and extremely cynical enemy fighting deep in the heart of his own civilian population presented a whole host of inherent limitations. We had to find ways to do things as precisely and proportionately as possible, while focusing on how to differentiate between terrorists and uninvolved civilians.

We did this through precision intelligence, specially adapted warheads and weaponry, and our ability to operate in a network.

Q. Any other urban tweaks to operating procedures?

A. Even before we employed force, we had to examine with a magnifying glass each target. We used [F-4 Skyhawks] to deliver more than 2 million leaflets urging the population to evacuate. We also used small, low-explosive missiles to warn civilians of imminent attack and to verify that buildings were evacuated prior to attack. In fact, there were quite a few approved targets that we didn't strike because of the collateral damage that might ensue.

Q. But didn't the opening 220 seconds - during which dozens of aircraft struck more than 100 preplanned targets throughout the Gaza Strip - involve many of the skills needed in a long-range blitz on Iran?

A. I won't comment on hypothetical differences or perhaps marginal similarities of a mission that may or may not take place. Suffice it to say that the beginning is very important. If we manage in the opening strike to hit many targets with precision and surprise, it can significantly influence the rest of the campaign.

This requires meticulous organization and planning, a practiced and properly equipped force, and a well-honed command and control structure.

Q. What was the key lesson from that opening week of the air campaign?

A. Preparing your intelligence in advance, having the precision-strike capabilities and practicing the plan until it becomes ingrained. In that opening week, we proved this by hitting hard the rockets, the weapon stores, launch sites, tunnels and the Hamas infrastructure.

Q. In the following two weeks of air-land battle, wasn't that the first time brigade commanders actually commanded their own, dedicated air assets?

A. It wasn't an entirely new concept, but we really emphasized it in the Gaza operation. The brigade commander was the one who had all the tools he needed and who commanded the operation, but professional considerations of how and under what conditions to employ the assets remained with the Air Force.

Our pilots, air crews and UAV operators worked directly with ground commanders from the very early planning stages - each one in his own sector, to the point that they knew one another. They recognized each other's voices over the network and could smell each other's sweat.

Q. And the key lesson from the air-land battle?

A. Full partnership with the ground forces - from a moral and physical perspective - which required well-planned, well-rehearsed, truly joint operations based on a suit of capabilities specifically sewn for their missions. Underlying all that is intimate cooperation between all relevant intelligence branches, which allowed commanders to constantly replenish their target banks during the course of the fighting.

Q. Was your use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) - was it 90 percent of the strikes? - an all-time high for air power?

A. In the dense, urban theater of Gaza, it goes without saying that we had to strike with precision, and in those populated areas, we used 100 percent PGMs. The only deployment of non-PGMs was in open areas, such as the smuggling tunnels in the south.

From all types of weaponry employed by our forces, we got to 81 percent use of precision-guided munitions, which is, indeed, unprecedented.

Q. And still, six months later, Israel continues to face international criticism over the large number of Palestinian civilians killed.

A. Any professional will tell you that the urban scenario is perhaps the most difficult environment in which to operate. We invested tremendous effort in adapting our operational concept and our [technologies, tactics and procedures] to this scenario, which, I must emphasize, is a scenario not of our choosing.

Hamas chose to launch rockets and store weapons among innocent civilians, and after years of intolerable attacks on our citizens, we were ordered to respond.

Q. How much of your force saw action in the Gaza war?

A. First of all, you need to remember that Cast Lead was not a war. It was an operation with limited goals for a specific scenario. In terms of the percentage of our force employed in the operation, if you look at our order of battle, the operational component was not nearly used to capacity. Some, like attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, operated at near capacity. In fact, UAVs were the big heroes of this campaign. Other components of our force structure worked at only 10 percent.

Q. Despite the damage inflicted on Hamas, they and other groups continued to launch salvos against Israel. How does this fact square with Israeli claims that deterrence was strengthened as a result of Cast Lead?

A. Deterrence cannot be scientifically measured, because it is a matter of perception in the minds of people that make policy and decisions. It's based on two elements: the power that is ascribed to you in terms of quality and quantity of war-fighting capabilities; and the willingness to use this power.

The latter component, in my opinion, surprised Hamas. They knew our strengths but did not believe in our resolve to use it in the way we did. So in my mind, the campaign strengthened deterrence. ■

By Barbara Opall-Rome in Tel Aviv.