מוחמד גנאים המוכר גם בכינויו אבו מאהר סומן ע"י הועד המרכזי של אשף לתפקיד ראש האירגון ויו"ר הרשות . ההחלטה התקבלה לאחר שאבו מאז הודיע כי יפרושן מהחיים הפוליטים בעוד שנה וחצי עם גמר הקדנציה.
הפרט המעניין בביוגרפיה של אבו מאהר דנן היא כי הוא עדיין נמצא בטוניס ושהה בה כל השנים , וכל זאת בגלל התנגדותו להסכמי אוסלו.....
פרט נוסף בביוגרפיה שלו הוא כי הוא החל את דרכו הפוליטית בארגון הקיצוני "האחים המוסלמים"....


וכל המידע החשוב הזה מוצנע בידיעה קטנטונת בתחתית עמוד 9 בעיתון "ידיעות אחרונות" של היום.
אז לכל מי שרוצה "לחזק את אבו מאזן" ומשלם על כך בשחרורמאות מחבלים ומאות מליוני שקלים ועוד הקלות... הנה הכתובת על הקיר ו כמו שאומר נחמיה שטרסלר: "שלא יעבדו עליכם"....

חמישה חברי כנסת מושחתים מצטופפים בחיפושית:
שניים מקדימה. שלושה מאחורה - גם מקדימה .

זהו הפתרון, וככל שהזמן חולף הוא הופך לבלתי נמנע!

ArmouredDov_D9

ארץ ישראל לעם ישראל - הציונות תנצח!
דף ה-D9 של MathKnight

THE THIRD OPTION

(Commentary by Pinhas Inbari, "Al Hamishmar", Nov 7, 1994, p.B9)

AT A POLITICAL CONFERENCE IN NABLUS LAST WEEK, PROMINENT SUPPORTERS OF THE PLO EXPRESSED CLEAR POSITIONS SUPPORTING THE VITAL NEED FOR MAINTAINING GOOD TIES WITH JORDAN. MAYBE A GENUINE OPTION FOR RABIN IN CONTINUING THE WAY FORWARD IS HIDDEN HERE: SUPPORT FOR THE TIES BETWEEN THE WEST BANK LEADERSHIP AND JORDAN, IN ORDER TO RESTORE TO THE PROCESS THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING SUPPORTING THE ECONOMY AND COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM.

PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin will meet tomorrow at the Erez checkpoint for one of their most important meetings, which, from many standpoints, could be termed decisive. After this meeting, both of them will have to make strategic decisions, since it is clear that it is impossible to continue with the negative dynamic which characterizes Israel-PLO relations.

The strategic choice facing Arafat is, whether he will implement the spirit of the Olso Agreements, whose essence is economic and security cooperation, in order to overcome the obstacles of the interim period with the positive approach, and to reach the talks on the permanent arrangement with a sense of achievement, not failure. It may be recalled that Israel abandoned the Palestinian delegation from the territories in favor of Arafat, since the alternative was victory for HAMAS and Islamic fundamentalism. The underlying assumption was ecomonic cooperation, in order to bring about economic gain in the territories, through mutual assistance in the common struggle against Islamic extremism. It is difficult to determine whether Arafat has implemented these early understandings, which Israel reached with Abu Mazen's people.

The continuation of the current situation would mean inevitable success for HAMAS in the struggle for the Palestinian street, since the Palestinian Authority has refrained from going out against HAMAS for security reasons. From an economic standpoint, Arafat's refusal to cooperate with the World Bank prevents aid from reaching the Palestinians.

There is concern that the Palestinians have already lost their hour of grace, and that the economic effort following the Casablanca Conference is currently pointing towards Jordan. Arafat may have already missed the 90 minute mark, and he may adapt a new strategy in the overtime period. At any rate, economic degeneration, in addition to giving free reign to Iz a-Din al-Kassem, means that extremist Islam will take control over the Palestinian Authority sooner or later.

Rabin is also facing a strategic decision, which is connected to the decision that Arafat will make. Will he continue to place his trust in the PLO Chairman, since he has no other satisfactory alternative, or will he look for another alternative?

One alternative is HAMAS. Police Minister Moshe Shahal suggested entering into negotiations with HAMAS, which would lead to an agreement and prevent both sides from injuring civilians. Now, more than ever before, we can make distinctions within HAMAS, and there is a wing inside HAMAS which is ready to enter into negotiations with Israel. The situation changed following the HAMAS massacre in the heart of Tel-Aviv, and it became clear that the chaos inside HAMAS is not less than the disorder within the PLO.

The bus bombing had important political significance. Since the rounds of talks in Washington, HAMAS members have tried to convince the West that the movement is a legitimate interlocutor, as a true national liberation organization, and is not a terrorist organization, since it only operates against IDF soldiers. The attack in Tel-Aviv not only spread remnants of the bus all around, but also the basic credibility of HAMAS as an organized movement. If its leadership cannot define guidelines for its members' actions, then HAMAS cannot be a considered a legitimate partner for political negotiation. The efforts to reach this type of negotiations with Israel is important as a political precedent, and it should be noted as a possibility for future developments. But HAMAS must make a significantly more serious effort in order to regain its credibility. IDF soldiers' blood is not cheap either. The terrorist attack in Tel-Aviv hurt Israel very much, but it also caused irreparable damage to HAMAS itself. Since the attack, which was carried out in HAMAS' name, religious figures in the West Bank have begun to deny affiliation with HAMAS. Everything bearing the name HAMAS is invalid. We have to wait and see if other relgious organizations form, what their political plans are, and if they are legitimate interlocutors.

Another option is Jordan, but this is not really feasible either. King Hussein is undergoing a process of continuing to sever ties with the territories, at least as long as Arafat is running things there. So long as the intifada is still popular in the territories, Hussein will stay away from all Palestinian issues as he would from fire. In Morocco, Crown Prince Hassan even expressed readiness (if only tactical) to disengage from Jerusalem in the permanent arrangements, 'if the Palestinians are capable of taking responsibility for the holy sites.'

The third, and real, option is to resume a dialogue with the West Bank leadership. This does not necessarily mean Faisal Husseini and his associates, but attention should be paid to the development of a conflict between the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah, Hebron and Nablus, and the PLO leadership in Gaza. This weekend provided us with another opportunity to follow the widening gap between the two centers. In Ramallah, the Fatah movement's political committees disobeyed Chairman Arafat and convened a political founding conference, in order to begin the process of democratic elections which will determine the movement's leadership. On the other hand, Arafat imposed on the Palestinian delegation to the talks with Israel on the elections in the territories a model of a presidential regime, which runs counter to the initial understandings regarding the nature of the elections. In Oslo, it was agreed that there would be elections for some sort of council. Arafat wants to be elected leader in direct elections. The council would be superfluous, according to the model which the Palestinian delegation is going to present to the Israeli delegation in Cairo. In previous models of the Palestinian delegation's proposals, Arafat was not supposed to be elected at all, rather to be automatically appointed, by virtue of his being the 'President of Palestine' and head of the PLO.

The political committees' model of elections runs counter to the nature of Arafat's presidential regime, and Arafat tried to prevent these elections. The Secretary of the Fatah Supreme Council in the West Bank, Marwan Barguti, hinted at Arafat's position when, in an interview on 7.10.94, he told Al Hamishmar that, 'Arafat did not oppose (the elections). In any case, that is a matter which, first of all, relates to us.' However, Arafat opposed them with all his might, and when he saw that the Fatah cadres of the political committees' wing were determined to implement this reform, he left for Tunis last week, in a further attempt to convince the opposing wing of Fatah which has remained there to join him in Gaza, in order to establish Fatah's center in the Strip. Arafat wanted the Fatah veterans, such as Farouk Kadumi, Abbas Zaki, Muhammad Jihad and Abu Maher Genaim, to halt the organization's process of democratization. As long as the various activists are dependent on Arafat's policy of appointments, Arafat will be able to control them. After they are elected, his ability to engage in political manipulation will be taken away.

The West Bank leadership is following developments in the crisis with Jordan with great concern. Closing the Jordan River bridges will be at their expense. A political conference was held in Nablus last week, in which several PLO supporters such as Khalil Shakaki expressed clear positions in favor of the need to maintain good links with Jordan and against the current confrontation with it.



Maybe a genuine option for Rabin in continuing the way forward is hidden here: encouraging the connection between the West Bank and Jordan, in order to return the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel to its original parameters, by encouraging economic growth and cooperation against terrorism. It must be borne in mind that the West Bank leadership has genuine links with the Islamic leadership which, in the wake of the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv, has begun to express positions detaching itself from HAMAS.

If Rabin chooses this option, he must know that it has a price. First of all, an actual halt to settlement activity. The announcement about resuming construction in places such as Alfei Menashe and eastern Jerusalem will make it difficult for the West Bank's Islamic leadership to accept responsibility further down the road. Also, the idea to go back to blowing up terrorists' houses or having undercover units step up their operations will make progress in this direction very difficult. Encouraging democratic elections in the territories, with the objective of forming a genuine leadership, must also be a guideline for the new policy.

Israel's choice between a weak and to a certain extent, corrupt Palestinian Authority that, 'would fight HAMAS without having to worry about the High Court of Justice,' or a strong leadership, chosen in democratic elections, which would bring real accomplishments for the Palestinians, has been decided. Arafat's weak rule will in the end lead to the rise of HAMAS. The new West Bank leadership which would emerge from elections in the territories would strengthen both the peace with Jordan and return the peace process with the Palestinians to its original foundations, which have been undermined.