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14-11-2007, 18:44
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חבר מתאריך: 04.03.05
הודעות: 490
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חדש?
בתגובה להודעה מספר 1 שנכתבה על ידי Daniel310RO שמתחילה ב "EFV - נגמ"ש חדש (נוסף) בעל יכולות מלאות ביבשה ובים"
חברים,
נסעתי לכמה ימים וכבר שכחנו?
פיתוח ה- EFV התחיל בשנת 1996! פיתוח השלב הנוכחי התחיל בשנת 2000!
את הפרוייקט הפיתוח הזה, עוד לפני שהסתיים כבר מלמדים בבתי הספר....
להלן תמצית דו"ח מבקר המדינה (בנושאים ביטחוניים בארה"ב המשרד הבודק הוא "החשב הכללי") על פרוייקט זה שפורסם לפני שנה וחצי:
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']GAO Finds Problems, Risks with USMC's EFV Program [/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']4 May 2006 [/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']In a just-released Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled: "Defense Acquisitions: The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle Encountered Difficulties in Design Demonstration and Faces Future Risks," the government investigative arm has much negative to report about the development of and outlook for the Marine Corps' new Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). [/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif'][/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']Since the beginning of the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) Phase in December 2000, EFV unit cost has increased 45% from $8.5 million to $12.3 million; [/font] [font='Verdana','sans-serif']The EFV programme schedule has grown by 35% or four years; [/font] [font='Verdana','sans-serif']The vehicle's reliability requirement has been reduced from 70 hours of continuous operation to 43.5 hours, and [/font] [font='Verdana','sans-serif']Several significant technical problems have surfaced, including problems with the hull electronic unit, the bow flap, and the hydraulics and reliability remains a challenge.[/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']The GAO identifies three areas of significant risk remain for demonstrating design and production maturity that have potential significant cost and schedule consequences. [/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']EFV plans are to enter low-rate initial production without requiring the contractor to demonstrate that the EFV's manufacturing processes are under control. [/font] [font='Verdana','sans-serif']The EFV programme will begin low-rate initial production without the knowledge that software development capabilities are sufficiently mature; and [/font] [font='Verdana','sans-serif']Two key performance parameters (KPPs) - reliability and interoperability - are not scheduled to be demonstrated until the initial test and evaluation phase in fiscal year 2010 -- about four years after low rate initial production (LRIP) has begun.[/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']Based on these concerns, the GAO recommends that the Marine Corps delay the EFV's entry into Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) until all KPPs are met. [/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']In a "reclama" to the report circulating Wednesday on Capitol Hill, prime contractor General Dynamics argues that while the GAO suggests that the EFV is experiencing cost, schedule and programmatic issues outside the Department of Defense (DoD) norm, EFV in fact remains a viable, austere, and event-driven programme that is performing "within the constructs of DoD policy and Directives and is achieving its stated programmatic requirements." [/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']GD and USMC programme officials note that part of the blame for EFV unit cost growth can be attributed to the DoD decision - reflected in the December 2004 Programme Budget Decision #753 - to cut $1.5 billion from the programme. According to the EFV Programme Manager Colonel Michael Brogan "If we were unconstrained by budget conditions, we could build faster and we could build EFV for less." [/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']As to recent schedule slips, Colonel Brogan attributes delays to the non-availability of Marines returning from Iraq to conduct an required Operational Assessment. The PM also notes that the GAO report contains "substantive errors" that were pointed out to the auditor who elected not to incorporate or correct them in his text. [/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']Responding the GAO's recommendation that LRIP approval be delayed, GD argues that DOD policy explicitly requires that requirements relative to reliability and interoperability be demonstrated during the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation period which is subsequent to the LRIP decision, noting that it's only at this juncture that the vehicle will have achieved its reliability growth and the opportunity to be tested in a fully operational environment." [/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']GD argues further that the EFV's entrance into LRIP is currently predicated on the demonstration of 95% manufacturing process compliance by the prime contractor and major suppliers and that, in accordance with DoD direction, all manufacturing process controls will be in place prior to full rate production. [/font]
[font='Verdana','sans-serif']Lastly, and perhaps most germane to the ongoing debate, GD takes issue with the GAO's conclusion that delaying LRIP initiation will avoid additional costs, noting that such a move would result in DoD incurring additional delays and added costs.[/font]
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Pashut Shiryoner
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