 |
14-02-2013, 17:51
|
|
|
|
חבר מתאריך: 13.11.04
הודעות: 16,823
|
|
|
שלשה מאמרים מעניינים על מלחמת האזרחים בסוריה, כולל מעורבות חיזבאללה
פורסמו בחודשים האחרונים על ידי חוקרים מה CTC, מכון מחקר הפועל במסגרת האקדמיה הצבאית האמריקנית בווסט-פוינט
Hizb Allah’s Role in the Syrian Uprising
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/hizb-...syrian-uprising
The details surrounding the death of Nassif and his companions are vague. Some reports claimed that they were killed when the militants detonated a roadside Improvised Explosive Device (IED) near a vehicle they were driving on a road in Qusair. Other reports suggested that they were killed in an ensuing firefight with insurgents after the IED detonated. Another report claimed that Nassif and his colleagues were killed after a rocket attack struck a building in which they were staying. The announcement of Nassif’s death was circulated on social media websites operated by the al-Farouq Battalions and other Syrian insurgent groups. Nassif’s death occurred after earlier reports of the death of Musa Ali Shahimi, another alleged Hizb Allah operative, who was reported to have perished in Syria under unclear circumstances in August. The alleged death of Hussein Abdel Ghani al-Nimr, another reported Hizb Allah member, was said to have occurred in the context of the crisis in Syria shortly following Nassif’s death, but under even murkier circumstances.
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) claims to have killed 60 Hizb Allah fighters in heavy clashes in Qusair in October that prompted Hizb Allah to request a truce to retrieve the bodies of their fallen comrades.Members of the Syrian security forces and irregular paramilitary units known as the shabiha (ghosts) captured by FSA militants have issued statements while in captivity claiming that they had received training or direct orders by Hizb Allah and Iran.The FSA also claimed to have detained 13 Hizb Allah members around the opposition stronghold city of Homs, in western Syria. FSA detachments also frequently showcase what they allege is evidence of some of the measures undertaken by Hizb Allah to navigate the battlefield, including its supposed reliance on using ambulances and other civilian vehicles
Regarding the circumstances surrounding Nassif’s death in Syria, Nasrallah offered an explanation that provides insight into Hizb Allah’s broader approach to the Syrian crisis. He emphasized that members of Hizb Allah were present in 23 villages and 12 farms in the vicinity of Qusair, but only to protect the approximately 30,000 residents of Lebanese origin—Shi`a, Sunni, Christian, and Alawite—who reside there and have come under repeated attacks by the FSA.
The potential fall of the Ba`athist regime would have a profound effect on Hizb Allah on many levels. In military terms, the possible loss of the strategic depth Syrian territory has provided Hizb Allah over the years would, in theory, hamper its ability to operate. The geographic continuity between Lebanon and Syria affords Hizb Allah with a safety zone to operate outside of its Lebanese home. Syria also serves as a logistical land bridge for supplying Hizb Allah with arms and materiel and enabling training and other operational activities. Syria’s alliance with Hizb Allah emboldens the latter’s deterrence posture relative to Israel and its enemies in Lebanon. Syria’s continued support for Hizb Allah also serves as a form of assurance for its allies—Muslim and Christian—in Lebanon’s inherently turbulent body politic
שימו לב לפסקה הבאה
Some predict that the potential collapse of its patron in Damascus will leave Hizb Allah irreparably weakened and vulnerable in the face of its numerous Lebanese and regional foes, especially Israel. Subscribers of this view, however, would be advised to revisit Hizb Allah’s evolution over the years, specifically the period of tensions surrounding the “war of the camps” (1984-89) characterized by the years of open warfare between Hizb Allah and its present-day allies the Amal Movement and Syria during Lebanon’s civil war (1975-1990). Hizb Allah has long established itself as an organic Lebanese organization that is able to wield tremendous social, political, economic, and military functions in Lebanon. Hizb Allah will remain relevant in Lebanon and beyond should the Ba`athist regime fall.
A Fight for the Spoils: The Future Role of Syria’s Armed Groups
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-fig...as-armed-groups
The FSA is largely a collection of defected Syrian army soldiers and local civilians who have grouped together to fight the Bashar al-Assad government in their immediate neighborhoods and towns. The FSA is not a unified entity, and as a result there will be difficulties restructuring or disbanding these forces in a new political system. Many FSA battalions are clan- and tribe-based, organized around a specific geographical area—such as a town, village or city district. Fighters answer to local commanders—often a respected member of the local community—not to a central command. In many respects, this operational system has worked to their advantage in a guerrilla war against the Syrian army.
שימו לב לפסקה הבאה
At its core, the rebel movement is not manifestly Islamist. Religious rhetoric has been a feature of war rebels seeking inspiration for centuries. Against a far more powerful army, the rebels turn to God for inspiration and to find meaning in continuing their fight under such testing conditions.As the regime upped the ferocity of its attacks on both civilians and armed opposition elements, the rebels have turned more religious in their rhetoric
Limited public backing from Western states makes the rebel movement often appear a product of, or at least sponsored by, Gulf states Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two conservative and undemocratic countries. Many secular Syrians, particularly in the major cities, fear Gulf influence in the country and believe these states are attempting to destabilize Syria and replace the al-Assad regime with an Islamist government. Indeed, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have openly committed financial support and weapons to the rebels. This is a version of events that also worries Syria’s non-Sunni minorities, who compose around a quarter of the country’s population
Moreover, foreign fighters have recently been confirmed in Syria fighting government forces. The Irish Times reported the presence of a number of Libyan fighters outside the northwestern town of Idlib in July. An Irish-Libyan revolutionary, Mehdi al-Harati, has been operating a militant group in Syria since last spring and has introduced an Islamic undertone to the Syrian revolt. A Syrian fighter working with this Libyan-led brigade, the Liwa al-Umma, said he wanted to take part in their operations because they are “fighting for truth and justice with an Islamic background.”
The perfunctory head of the FSA, Riad al-Asaad, is unlikely to hold much sway in a post-Assad Syria since he has spent much of the revolution in Turkey rather than fighting regime troops inside the country. He is a figurehead; few FSA members answer to him today, and they are unlikely to in the future.
Many in the newly rejuvenated gangs are career criminals whose loyalty was bought through a series of “political prisoner amnesties” enacted by the regime over the course of the uprising.The shabiha are mostly drawn from the Alawite sect to which President Bashar al-Assad belongs and have roamed town centers and surrounded mosques at prayer time since the uprising’s beginning. They have been accused of atrocities in the towns of Houla, Tremseh and Qubeir in May, June and July 2012.
As of December 2011, one respected source claimed that shabiha members were reportedly being paid 50,000 Syrian pounds ($800) per month in cash that came from Iran via Hizb Allah in neighboring Lebanon. If true, Iranian meddling in Syria illustrates yet another difficulty facing any post-Assad government. The possible role played by the shabiha gangs after the inevitable demise of the al-Assad regime is difficult to quantify and chart. If regional supporters Hizb Allah and Iran provide them with financial backing, however, then they will be a destructive force during the reorganization of the Syrian state. With outside backing, the shabiha could mount a counterinsurgency, possibly resulting in a long-term civil conflict.
Shabiha Militias and the Destruction of Syria
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/shabi...uction-of-syria
Mafia Beginnings
A word rarely heard before March 2011, the original term shabiha, meaning “ghosts,” referred to the darkened-windowed Mercedes-Benz cars used in the 1970s and 1980s by Alawite smugglers from the Syrian coast. Among the original bootlegging leaders included Malik and Jamil al-Assad, a half-brother and brother respectively of former Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad. These men and others made huge profits smuggling cigarettes and luxury items from Lebanon. They terrorized local populations, openly carried weapons and considered themselves beyond the reach of the law in part because of their ties to the ruling family.[7] As president, Hafiz al-Assad and later his sons Mahir and Basil arrested many of these smugglers and for the most part brought their criminal enterprises under control after they began to undermine the state’s authority. Yet since March 2011, they have been recast by the regime as an indispensable force of intimidation and repression against dissenting populations
At a time when peaceful protests were more widespread across Syria than they are today, militias including those with ties to the “original” Alawite shabiha gangsters, vigilante gangs and pro-regime civilians were deployed to intimidate, beat and detain protestors. Although hard evidence is difficult to acquire, a leading Damascus-based journalist claimed in 2011 that the shabiha’s numbers swelled with the release of hundreds of criminals from prison during a number of government amnesties. As such, the established shabiha—those with close familial ties to the al-Assads—were positioned to command newly released criminals whose loyalty had been bought by the regime.
As in the cases of Houla, Dariya, and other cities, one tactic employed by the regime to quell dissent in towns and villages close to sensitive areas appears to involve sending in paramilitary shabiha to carry out summary executions of civilians and to then disfigure the bodies on a mass, indiscriminate scale.The tactic in these cases, it appears, is to drive fear into the local populations so that they discontinue their dissidence.
Alawites, from whom the vast majority of shabiha members and leadership are drawn, comprise about 12% of Syria’s population. Areas such as Mezzah 86 in southwest Damascus, a sea of poorly-constructed houses set upon a hill overlooking the city and located several hundred meters from the main presidential palace, are virtually inaccessible to outsiders. This area, built to house the many thousands of Alawites who moved to the capital to take up government jobs during Hafiz al-Assad’s presidency, is today surrounded on all sides by shabiha and checkpoints. For the Alawite residents here, the government has provided electricity and water for decades without charge—inextricably intertwining the fate of this population to that of the state.
The psychology that Syria is “Assad’s Syria,” a country ruled by Alawites, is so prevalent that pro-Assad militias are unlikely to be easily brought to a negotiating table. This is further complicated by the fact that there are no immediately obvious shabiha leaders who could bring the roving militias under control. Little is known of the shabiha leadership, where it exists today, but prominent figures are likely to be trusted relatives of powerful Alawite groups such as the Shalish, Makhlouf and Deeb families. |
|
ראשי
צ'אט
(קרדיט למרשי)
A nation is a society united by delusions about its ancestry and by common hatred of its neighbors - William Ralph
מצב כלאיים
