We Can’t Always Count On Smart Bombs: CSBA

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. on June 24, 2015 at 9:00 AM
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זהו מאמר שמתאר את הבעיתיות בלהסתמך רק על פצצות חכמות כגון JDAM ו-SDB ולדעת הכתב יש צורך בפצצות חכמות יותר וארוכות טווח
בחלק הראשון העלתי בקצרה את הבעיה ובחלק האחרון את הפיתרון לפי דעת הכתב
בסוף המאמר מצורף קישור למי שמעוניין לקרוא את כולו

חלק ראשון

As enemy defenses grow more sophisticated and longer-range, the US needs new tactics — and longer-ranged weapons.

Washington’s gotten used to war on easy mode. Policymakers may debate the strategic value of air campaigns in places like Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, but they assume the smart bombs will hit their targets. One bomb, one target, one boom

That assumption is no longer safe, says a new study from the influential Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. (CSBA gave us a copy in advance). Countermeasures are growing more sophisticated and more common. Advanced anti-aircraft missiles can snipe a single smart bomb out of the sky, let alone the US aircraft carrying it. Jammers can scramble radar and GPS. Lasers and high-powered microwaves are becoming practical weapons against incoming missiles. So the smart bomb won’t always get through

חלק שני

New weapons could incorporate some degree of stealth and jamming, to make it harder for enemy defenses to detect and target them. Some might be hypersonic, achieving speeds above Mach 5 to dash through enemy defenses before they can react.

One day, really smart smart bombs could even incorporate some measure of artificial intelligence. If all the autonomous munitions headed for one target were shot down, while another target was struck on the first try, the surplus smart weapons from the target already destroyed could divert themselves in flight to where they were still needed. Such “collaborative” weapons should be markedly more efficient, Gunzinger and Clark calculate, dramatically reducing the number required.

“Collaborative” weapons with artificial intelligence to coordinate their own attacks can be dramatically more efficient.

Letting smart weapons think for themselves — let alone make plans together — might be more than a little unnerving. There are alternatives: Some existing weapons already have datalinks to let human operators retarget them in flight. But against an electromagnetically sophisticated adversary, jamming might cut the humans out of the loop. The only option available might be short-range communications between weapons in the same salvo, or even radio-less “swarming” tactics modeled on insects.

The report recommends a host of other measures, such as shuffling F-35B jump jets among multiple bases to avoid attack, building more long-range bombers, and changing how Navy ships defend themselves from enemy missiles. But for Washington policymakers who’ve come to take smart bombs for granted, the study’s most important lesson is they can’t.

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/06/...&_hsmi=19335729