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סיכום סוף שנה - ריכוז דו"חות על ה F-22 שהתפרסמו במהלך 2012
מדובר ב 4 דו"חות שונים, שיש בינהם גם חפיפה מסוימת כמובן, ליד כל אחד מהם האנקדוטות העיקריות.
דוח מצב לסוף שנת 2012, שימו לב שלמרות שכל המטוסים נמסרו ופס הייצור נסגר, עדיין נדרש תקציב גדול יחסית של חצי מיליארד לשנת 2013 – עדכוני 3.2B, מו"פ נוסף, התקנת גיבוי למערכת החמצן (בעקבות ועדת החקירה), תוספות ציוד הנדרש למרכזים הלוגיסטים וטייסות התחזוקה על מנת לתמוך ולתחזק את צי המטוסים
Air Force F-22 Fighter Program
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31673.pdf
procurement funding for modification of in-service aircraft and $36.7 million to equip Air
Logistics Centers to perform F-22 maintenance. The Administration’s proposed FY2013 defense budget also requests a new start program, funded at $140.1 million in research and development, for the Increment 3.2B software, and $371.7 million in FY2013 research and development funding for F-22A Squadrons.
במאי נמסר המטוס ה 195 והאחרון לחהא"א. המספר הזה כולל 177 מטוסי ייצור סדירים, 16 מטוסי PRTV (אחד מהם חליפי במקום אחר שהתרסק) ו 2 מטוסי EMD (ומעבר לכך שני אבות הטיפוס מראשית שנות ה-90). זאת בהשוואה לתכנון מקורי לרכש 750 מטוסים בשיא המלחמה הקרה. כבר בדצמבר 2011 (אחרי שהמטוס האחרון ירד מפס הייצור) החלה לוקהיד-מרטין לקפל את פס הייצור, בצורה שתאפשר הקמתו מחדש בעתיד, כולל צילומי וידאו של כל שלבי הרכבת המטוס, במטרה להכשיר עובדים בצורה זריזה לו תידרש הפתיחה מחדש ביום מן הימים. בשיאו עסקו בפרויקט 5600 עובדי לוקהיד ברחבי ארה"ב, מתוכן 940 בפס הייצור במריאטה. נכון למועד פרסום הדו"ח מצבת העובדים קטנה לשליש ורוב עובדי פס הייצור צפויים לפיטורים. בראיית תעסוקתית רחבה יותר, הפרויקט העסיק ישירות 8800 משרות (כולל עובדי בואינג ופרט אנד וויטני שעסקו במנועים) ועוד כ 16200 משרות אצל קבלני משנה. לוקהיד מעריכה שמעבר ל 25K המשרות הללו (הפזורות על פני 44 מדינות בארה"ב) עסקו בפרויקט בעקיפין עוד כ 70K נפשות.
Production Shutdown
On May 3, 2012, Lockheed Martin delivered the 195th F-22 to the Air Force, completing the fleet.9 That final aircraft had come off the Lockheed Martin production line in Marietta, GA, on December 13, 2011.10 Following its assembly, Lockheed Martin had begun to store “a total of more than 30,000 jigs, fixtures and other ‘tooling’ used to build the plane” in order to “leave open an option to restart the premier plane’s production relatively cheaply.”11 Lockheed Martin had also documented the assembly process, including videotaping each step of assembly, in order to more quickly train workers to assemble F-22s in the event of a production line restart.12 About 5,600 Lockheed employees worked on the F-22 program at its peak in 2005, including 944 in Marietta. The current number is 1,650 companywide, 930 in Marietta....
Lockheed states that the F-22 program in 2009 supports a total of 8,800 direct jobs at Lockheed’s Marietta, GA, and Fort Worth, TX, locations, and at Boeing and Pratt & Whitney. Lockheed estimates, on the basis of purchase order receipts, that the F-22 program supports an additional 16,200 supplier-firm jobs in 44 states around the country. Lockheed combines these two figures to estimate that the F-22 supports a total of about 25,000 direct jobs. Using a multiplier of 2.8 to estimate jobs elsewhere in the economy that are indirectly supported by these 25,000 jobs, Lockheed estimates that an additional 70,000 jobs are indirectly supported by the F-22 program. Lockheed combines the figures of 25,000 and 70,000 to estimate that a total of 95,000 jobs are supported either directly or indirectly by the F-22 program.33 A map provided by Lockheed shows roughly 25,800 direct F-22-related jobs in 44 states. According to the map, states with more than 1,000 direct F-22-related jobs include California (6,532 jobs), Texas (3,526), Georgia (2,821), Connecticut (2,205), New Hampshire (2,197), Washington (1,491), and Florida (1,025). The map shows several states with a few hundred to several hundred direct F-22-related jobs each, and a number of states with fewer than 100 (in some cases fewer than 25) direct F-22-related jobs each. The map shows four states—North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming—as having no direct F-22-related jobs in 2009. The map does not depict Alaska or Hawaii.34 The potential costs of restarting production (discussed in “Potential Production Restart” above) may significantly change the economic argument for procuring more F-22s, were the United States to bear all of the restart costs. If production is restarted (e.g., to provide F-22s to a foreign buyer), the United States might be able to acquire additional F-22s more economically than were it to restart production solely to increase the U.S. F-22 fleet.
Planned Total Procurement Quantity
Since the submission to Congress in early 2005 of the FY2006 budget, DOD plans called for procuring a total of about 187 operational F-22s. The final figure of 195 includes
177 production aircraft, 15 Production Representative Test Vehicle (PRTV) aircraft, 1 replacement test aircraft, and 2 Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) aircraft funded with research and development funding.35
The final figure of 177 production aircraft includes 4 F-22s whose procurement was included in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act. The Air Force originally envisaged a production run of 750 F-22s. The figure was reduced to 648 in 1991. DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review reduced the planned number of production F-22s to 438 (plus 4 pre-production versions, later reduced to 2), which was enough to support 4 F-22 fighter wings in a total Air Force force structure of 20 wings (13 active; 7 Reserve/National Guard). The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reduced the planned number of
production F-22s to 339, which was enough to support three F-22 fighter wings in a 20-wing force structure (12 active; 8 Reserve/National Guard).
קיים ויכוח ער לגבי הצורך בפיתוח והוספת יכולת אויר קרקע לרפטור:
1. אלטרנטיבות הגיוניות יותר – מטוסי LEGACY, כטב"מים וכניסתו הצפויה של ה F-35 לשירות לקראת סוף העשור.
2. מערכות המטוס הגיעו סוף סוף לרמת בשלות ויציבות והוספת רכיבי תוכנה וחומרה הנדרשים לאוויר-קרקע תפר זאת ותעלה ממון רב.
3. הוספת רכיבים קורנים תהפוך את המטוס לפחות חקמני ופגיע יותר
Skeptics could argue that upgrading the F-22’s air-to-ground and ISR capabilities is not critical in light of the substantial air-to-ground capability of the F-35, which is to be procured in large numbers, and the ISR capabilities of other existing or planned DOD systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). They could argue that resolving instability problems with the F-22’s advanced avionics has been a significant contributor to the program’s development cost, and that adding a new feature such as an air-to-ground radar or new communications capabilities could jeopardize the progress that has been made in the F-22’s avionics software. They could argue that controlling the F-22’s electronic emissions is a key component of making the aircraft elusive to enemy defenses, and that if the upgrades make the F-22 less stealthy, the benefits of these modifications might not be worth the risks.
מאמר אחר המשווה בין תכנית השדרוג של ה F-22 לתוכניות דומות לשדרוג מטוסי סדרת ה TEENS. חהא"א צופה השקעה של כמעט 10 מיליארד דולר (!!) לאורך העשור הקרוב בהמשך שדרוג צי ה F-22 (הקטן יחסית) עד לשלב INCREMENT 3.2 B האולטימטיבי הצפוי למבצעיות מלאה בכל הצי בסוף העשור הנוכחי. הסכום הנ"ל חריג משמעותית בהשוואה למטוסי ה TEEN ונובע בין היתר מהמורכבות בהטמעת שדרוגים בתוך מטוס עתיר טכנולוגיות, הנושא את רוב מערכותיו ואת חימושו פנימית ומתוך ראיה שאין לפגוע בחמקנות שלו ובאינטגרציה בין המערכות הפנימיות הרבות.
Comparison of F-22A and Legacy Fighter Modernization Programs
http://gao.gov/assets/600/590505.pdf
The Air Force expects to invest a total of $9.7 billion in F-22A modernization through 2023. The Air Force and Navy have modernized many of their fighter and attack aircraft over the past several decades. Given this historical experience and concerns about the mounting cost of F-22A modernization, GAO was asked to examine the history of the modernization programs of the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18, and compare those legacy programs with the F-22A modernization program.
The F-22A program is developing and retrofitting new capabilities onto a complex stealth aircraft, which is costly—currently estimated at $9.7 billion total. Legacy modernization programs were less complex, and thus less costly, and incorporated mature technologies onto new production aircraft. Accurately identifying and comparing the total cost of each modernization program is difficult. Each of the programs, including the F-22A, initially managed and funded modernization as a continuation of its baseline program, so modernization costs and funding were not clearly identified in selected acquisition reports or budget documents.
שימו לב לביקורת (בדיעבד כמובן ממרום 20 שנה) לתפישה המונוליטית שעמדה מאחורי ה F-22 – קפיצת מדרגה עצומה בשלב אחד, במקום שלבי ביניים – הפך את תהליך הפיתוח למורכב ויקר בגלל דרישות מבצעיות גבוהות מאד
The Air Force did not expect any major shifts in the F-22A’s primary mission and thus did not plan for future modernization upgrades. From the outset, the Air Force’s F-22A development strategy was to pursue a quantum leap in capability in a single development program, referred to as a single-step approach, to develop and field a stealthy aircraft with advanced capabilities to replace its aging F-15C/D fleet and perform air superiority missions. The F-22A modernization program began in reaction to a significant change in the aircraft’s primary mission. In contrast, the legacy programs we reviewed established modernization requirements that focused on using mature technologies to upgrade the capabilities of their respective aircraft to better perform the missions for which they had been initially developed.
תכנית השדרוג ל F-22 מקורו בשינוי בדרישות המטוס שיזם חהא"א ב 2003 כך שיוכל לבצע גם אוויר-קרקע (חהא"א חשש מצמצום משמעותי נוסף בפרויקט ורצה להראות שהמטוס ורסטילי יותר). מאחר ודרישות אלו לא היו חלק מאפיון המקורי של המטוס (שכזכור במועד ההחלטה הנ"ל היה כבר אחרי עשור של פיתוח ושנתיים בלבד לפני מבצוע המטוס), האופי האינטגרטיבי של מערכות המטוס, העובדה שמדובר במטוסים פעילים בטייסות ומאחר ויש צורך למזער את הפגיעה של המערכות החדשות שיתווספו במהלך השדרוג ביכולותיו החמקניות של המטוס, הפך תהליך השדרוג לארוך, מורכב ומרובה סיכונים מאין כמוהו – מ 2003 ועד מועד כתיבת הדו"ח ב 2012 עלויות הפרויקט הוכפלו ולוחות הזמנים לכניסת רמה 3.2 B האולטימטיבית זלגו כבר ב 7 שנים תמימות מ 2010 לאזור 2017, כאשר שדרוג כל המטוסים המיועדים יסתיים רק ב 2020.
F-22A modernization was initiated in 2003, in response to new requirements for the aircraft to perform ground attack missions in addition to the air supremacy missions it had originally been designed for. Given the magnitude of this shift in mission, and because the original development program had not anticipated the need for such a change, critical information about requirements, technical scope, schedule, and funding was not available at the time modernization began. As a result, the initial cost and schedule estimates for the overall modernization program were not fully informed—that is, they were not knowledge based—and have since changed significantly, with costs doubling and schedule slipping by more than 7 years.
It should also be noted that retrofitting upgrades onto stealth aircraft with fully integrated computer systems—referred to as fused or integrated avionics—like the F-22A is a riskier and more complex process than integrating new technologies into a conventional aircraft with separate and distinct computer systems and software for each subsystem—known as federated avionics—even if the technologies are mature
For the F-22A, that software will have to be fully integrated into the aircraft’s overall avionics system and tested thoroughly to determine its impact on all of the aircraft’s other systems, which is costly and time consuming. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials point out that the legacy systems also had to integrate and test new software to ensure that it would work properly, but because the avionics systems were federated that process did not take as long and was less costly. In addition, the legacy aircraft had greater freedom to place new technologies onto the exterior of the aircraft or make structural changes as needed.
Given the stealth and avionics complexities of the F-22A, it is likely that it will be more costly to modernize than the F-15, F-16, or F/A-18. F-22A contractor officials emphasize that these complexities translate into labor hours and ultimately costs that the legacy programs would not have incurred. The total cost of F-22A modernization—through Increment 3.2B—is currently estimated to be $9.7 billion. In addition, the majority of the F-22A modernization upgrades will be retrofitted onto fielded aircraft—a complex and costly undertaking—and by the time all of the required capabilities are fielded the amount of useful life remaining on the aircraft will likely be limited
תיאור שני תתי השלבים של INCREMENT 3.2
Increment 3.2 has been broken into two phases, referred to as Increments 3.2A and 3.2B, and is expected to deliver additional advanced global strike capabilities. The Air Force initially expected this phase to deliver the final installment of capabilities that would meet the full air-to-ground requirements. The related capabilities include enhanced weapons, improved communications, and self-protection upgrades. The program office originally expected to begin fielding these capabilities in 2010, but according to program officials, requirements and funding instability have caused the program schedule to slip by more than 7 years, and they do not currently known when the full capability will be achieved.
Increment 3.2A development began in November 2011 and is expected to update existing software to enhance Electronic Protection and Combat Identification capabilities. The first developmental test events for this increment are expected to start in late 2012 and be completed in late 2013. Operational testing is planned to conclude in early 2014 with fielding of Increment 3.2A planned to occur between 2014 and 2016. In December 2011, the Air Force received approval from OSD to begin the process of structuring Increment 3.2B as a new major defense acquisition program. The formal start of system development—Milestone B—on Increment 3.2B is planned for the first quarter of fiscal year 2013, with fielding to take place between 2017 and 2020. Key efforts in Increment 3.2B include integration of the AIM-9X and AIM-120D missiles and upgrading Geolocation and Electronic Protection subsystems.
לשם השוואה, פרטים על תוכנית השדרוג המקבילה של ה F-16
The Air Force received approval to start MSIP Stage III in June 1985. This stage introduced further advances in the F-16 fire-control radar and computer capacity, in addition to introducing night vision infrared navigation and targeting, global positioning system, and High-speed Antiradiation Missiles (HARM), among other changes in weapon, radar, and avionics systems. Stage III ultimately resulted in two new F-16C/D block configurations—Block 40/42 and Block 50/52—each with its own distinct mission focus. According to the RAND Corporation, the Air Force’s approach was a “development-and-integration approach” that was marked by “the continual introduction of pre-planned changes and updates.” During Stage III, the Air Force continued to monitor the technology market and work closely with technology developers to mature and integrate new capabilities into the aircraft while concurrently producing and fielding of Block 30/32 aircraft. The key focus of the Block 40/42 modifications was the incorporation of nighttime flying and targeting capability, primarily provided by the Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) system, to support precision strike missions, which had been deferred from the Block 25 program. In contrast, the Block 50/52 modifications focused on fully integrating the HARM targeting system to provide the capability to suppress enemy air defenses. While the development programs for both LANTIRN and HARM were managed and funded as distinct acquisition efforts, the F-16 program office provided aircraft for flight testing. This collaborative approach, which had also been used during previous MSIP stages, allowed the technology programs to mature while also allowing the F-16 program to address integration and performance problems before investing in significant modifications. The Air Force procured a combined total of 913 Block 40/42 and 50/52 aircraft between fiscal years 1987 and 2001. The first Block 40/42 aircraft was funded for procurement in fiscal year 1987 and delivered to the Air Force in December 1988—less than 4 years after Stage III began. The first Block 50/52 was funded for procurement in fiscal year 1990 and delivered to the Air Force in October 1991, over 6 years after Stage III began.
עוד מחקר על תכנית השדרוג של ה F-22,
F-22A Modernization Program Faces Cost, Technical, and Sustainment Risks
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590593.pdf
The Air Force currently plans to spend about $11.7 billion to modernize and improve the reliability of the F-22A, the Air Force’s fifth generation air superiority fighter. About $9.7 billion will be spent on specific modernization increments and related support costs, and nearly $2 billion will be used to improve the reliability of the F-22A and make structural repairs. Originally designed to counter air threats posed by the former Soviet Union, the post-Cold War era spurred efforts to add new missions and capabilities to the F-22A, including improved air-to-air and robust air-to-ground attack and capabilities. In 2003, the Air Force established the F-22A modernization program to develop and insert new capabilities. The timing and scope of the modernization program has changed over time, costs have significantly increased, and fielding of some capabilities has been delayed. In this context, you asked us to evaluate cost, schedule, and performance outcomes and risks of the F-22A modernization program.1
שימו לב שבניגוד למחקר הקודם המדבר רק על שדרוג התוכנה והיכולות (בהיקף של כמעט 10 מיליארד דולר) פה מפורט גם על שדרוגים הנוגעים לאמינות המטוסים ותיקונים מבניים הנדרשים בהם בהיקף של 2 מיליארד דולר נוספים כך שהסכום הכולל אורך העשור הקרוב עומד על כמעט 12 מיליארד דולר. מדוע זה נדרש? כי ה F-22 התגלה בתור "מלכת מוסכים" הסובל מזמינות נמוכה, MTBF נמוך, שעות תחזוקה גבוהות מהצפוי פר שעת טיסה והכל מתורגם כמובן לעלויות תפעול גבוהות בהרבה מהצפוי.
In addition to these efforts, in 2006, the Air Force began a Reliability and Maintainability Maturation Program (RAMMP). Although the Air Force does not consider this part of the modernization program, it is integral to making the F-22A weapon system more available, reliable, and maintainable. Since the F-22A’s initial fielding in 2006, maintenance issues have prevented it from achieving reliability and availability requirements, and fleet operating and support (O&S) costs are much higher than projected earlier in the program. In addition to capability upgrades, the F-22A budget also funds efforts to address reliability and maintainability deficiencies that have increased support costs and have prevented the F-22A from meeting a key performance requirement. RAMMP is to develop and implement enhancements to increase aircraft availability, make maintenance faster and less costly, and reduce total life-cycle operating and support costs and cost per flying hour. While RAMMP is expected to reduce life-cycle costs over the long term, up-front investments to help realize future cost reductions have increased.
The program had planned to spend about $258 million between 2005 and 2011, but actual investments through 2011 were about $528 million. The total RAMMP funding requirement through the year 2023 is now estimated at almost $1.3 billion. When it started in 2006, a major goal of RAMMP was to improve F-22A reliability to meet its key performance requirement by the time the fleet reached maturity at 100,000 total flight hours. This performance indicator, known as mean time between maintenance (MTBM), required aircraft in the F-22A fleet to fly an average of 3 hours between maintenance events, excluding routine servicing and inspections.The program was not well-defined when it began in 2003, has had fluid scope and cost, and has been challenging from an oversight perspective as it was blended into the baseline F-22A program rather than being managed separately.
מידע נוסף על האיחור הצפוי במבצוע ה INCREMENT האחרון, שאמור לכלול שדרוג 143 מטוסים לרמת 3.2B והשארת 36 מטוסים ברמת 2 למטרות אימונים
When the F-22A modernization development program began, the Air Force expected to have all current planned capabilities integrated and fielding started by 2010. Now, the final increment is not expected to begin fielding until 2017, 7 years later than initially planned. Air Force officials stated that they underestimated the sheer magnitude of the modernization effort, both in the amount of time required to develop and integrate the capability, and costs to complete the modernization. According to program officials, contributing factors to delays include (1) additional requirements, (2) unexpected problems and delays during testing, and (3) research, development, testing, and evaluation funding fluctuations. Figure 2 compares the initial and latest schedules
According to Air Force officials, the program currently intends to upgrade 143 aircraft with the full complement of modernized capabilities by fiscal year 2020 and retain 36 aircraft with only Increment 2 capabilities to be used in training. Increment 3.1 is being fielded in fiscal years 2011 to 2016 and Increment 3.2A from fiscal years 2014 to 2016. Increment 3.2B, the last currently planned increment, is expected to field from fiscal years 2017 and 2020. Future capability enhancements are expected to follow the current modernization program, but have not been defined.
תשובת חהא"א – ניסיונות שונים להפחחת עלויות של שני שלבי INCREMENT 3.2 בין היתר באמצעות ביצוע בדיקות במעבדות הניסויים קרקעיות (הנמצאות בחצר לוקהיד-מרטין במרייטה) במקום ניסוי טיסה יקרים, ביצוע יותר ניסוים וניסויים מקיפים יותר במטרה לאתר כשלים ותקלות בשלבים מוקדמים יותר של תכנית השדרוג ועוד. מאידך האמצעים הללו מעוררים גם חששות בקרב אנשי ה GAO - למשל שרכיבים עדינים ויקרי ערך במעבדת הניסויים יכולים להיפגע בעת מסירתה לחהא"א והעברתה למרלו"ג שלו באוגדן, יוטה וכן שמומחים המלווים אותה יעזבו את התכנית בגלל חוסר רצון להעביר את מגוריהם לשם.
The Air Force is seeking ways to reduce the costs of Increments 3.2A and 3.2B by streamlining program activities. Officials want to make more use of developmental tests to also satisfy operational test requirements, allowing the program to identify errors for correction earlier and reducing overall costs by eliminating redundant tests. The program also intends to increase its use of F-22A ground laboratories to substitute for more expensive flight tests. The F-22A lab infrastructure is an extensive, distributed system of dedicated labs that integrate and certify flight software releases to the field and support F-22A modernization, production and sustainment activities. However, there are technical risks if lab tests do not fully replicate the performance of actual F-22A aircraft in intended environments. Officials are also expecting to save money by relocating the Raptor Avionics Integration Lab—a critical work site that stimulates sensors for targeting—from Marietta, Georgia, to Ogden Air Logistics Center, Utah by the summer of 2012. Program officials acknowledge there are some risks in this. For example, unique equipment could be damaged during the move and experienced lab staff could decide to leave the F-22A program rather than relocate.
סקירה כללית של תכנית ה F-22 שכתב סא"ל בחהא"א. כבר ב 1994 לפני כמעט 20 שנה סמוך לתחילת הפיתוח של ה F-22 התפרסם דו"ח גלוי של ה GAO שצפה כי 6 מתוך 7 מדינות האיום העיקריות על ארה"ב (השביעית הייתה סין) אינן צפויות לפתח ו/או לרכוש מטוסים שיאתגרו את העליונות האווירית של ה F-15 מבחינה איכותית או כמותית לפחות עד 2014 (קרי 20 שנה מיום כתיבת הדו"ח), בין היתר עקב העלויות הגבוהות הכרוכות ברכש ותפעול מטוסי כאלו. חהא"א התנגד לדו"ח (שסיכן את ספינת הדגל שלו) בטענה שה F-22 מהווה שדרוג משמעותי על ה F-15 ברוב תחומי הליבה הנדרשים ממטוס קרב ונדרש בכל מקרה מאחר ואלפי סימולציות הוכיחו את שמטוסי דור 4 יתקשו להשיג עליונות אווירית בפני מטוס הקרב הרוסי הבא (ה MFF , שלבסוף בוטל בטרם נכנס לייצור). צידוק נוסף (רלוונטית גם לנו...) ל F-22 (ועוד כמטוס קרקע-אוויר, משהו שבסופו של דבר לא היה אפילו חלק מהדרישה המקורית כפי שראינו בדו"חות הקודמים) הוא שטק"א מתקדמים דוגמת ה S-300 וה S-400 הופכים את האמ"טים לקטלניים מתמיד כלפי מטוסי דור 4.
מנגד, מגרעותיו של ה F-22 מגודרות כטווח קצר יחסית וצרכי תחזוקה גבוהים, בגלל מורכבות המטוס הפנימית והחיצונית (חומרי ה RAM) כאחד. הטווח הקצר יחסית (יותר מה F-16 אך הרבה פחות מה F-15, כך לטענת הדו"ח) מגביל גם את האפשרות להשתמש ב SUPER CRUISE. לטענת הדו"ח היכולת המוגבלת של ה F-22 לשאת מטענים חיצוניים בתצורת אוויר-קרקע והטווח הקצר (לצד העדר איום אווירי מנגד) היו הגורמים העיקריים לכך שהמטוס לא לקח חלק במלחמות באפגניסטן, בעירק ובלוב. טענה משמעותית נוספת היא שחהא"א "מישכן" את צי מטוסי ה LEGACY שלו למשך 20 שנה כמעט לטובת מימון פרויקטי ה F-22 וה F-35 – קרי מעט לשדרג מטוסים קיימים או לרכוש מטוסי LEGACY חדשים ועל כן גילם הממוצע של המטוסים הוא ניכר ומכאן תחלואות תחזוקה ומבנה רבות. כמו כן ה F-22 נרכש בסופו של דבר במספר קטן יחסית ועל כן ה F-15 ימשיך לשרת לצידו כמטוס עליונות אווירית למשך שנים רבים, ושוב בעלויות תחזוקה ניכרות למטוס ישן.
הצי לעומת זאת בחר במסלול פחות שאפתני של ה F-18E/F , שהוא שדרוג אבולוציוני ולא רבולוציוני של קודמו ואכן מצבו נראה "טוב יותר" – על כל מטוס F-22 אחד הצי רוכש כמעט 4 מטוסי F-18E/F ומעבר לכך מדובר במטוס ורסטילי בהרבה עם יכולות א"א, א"ק, תדלוק, סיור ול"א (גראולר) ושתי תצורות (חדמ"ש ודומ"ש). כמו כן התכנית עמדה (כמעט) ביעדי הזמן והעלות ובוודאי בהשוואה לפיגורים העצומים בתכנית ה F-22.
The F-22 Acquisition Program
Consequences for the US Air Force’s Fighter Fleet
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/digit...012/F-Niemi.pdf
An unclassified version, along with public testimony, followed in early 1994.31 The report assessed the F-15 as superior to projected air threats in four of five performance categories (flight performance, radar, long-range missiles, short-range missiles, and range). Additionally, the report analyzed seven countries whose air forces represented potential threats to future air superiority missions. It concluded that (except for China) each of those air forces possessed between 188 and 460 fighter aircraft, far fewer than the number of US air superiority F-15s in service at that time. Furthermore none of them had more than a handful of advanced fighter aircraft with performance in the F-15’s class. Finally, the report predicted that high costs likely would prevent proliferation of these aircraft. In short the GAO recognized that the F-22 greatly improved air superiority
capabilities but contended that the F-15 could adequately meet air superiority requirements through at least 2014. The service aggressively countered the GAO report, arguing that it underestimated the threat while overestimating the F-15’s capabilities.
The Air Force’s own analysis projected that the F-15 was inferior to the future threat in “range” and “short-range missiles,” equal in “radar” and “long-range missiles,” and superior only in the “flight-performance” category. Ironically, today’s F-22 fails to deliver improved performance in those areas in which the Air Force assessed the F-15 as most deficient: range and short-range missiles.32 Nonetheless, the service reinforced
its F-22 argument with thousands of simulations modeling the F-15 against the Mnogofunksionalni Frontovoy Istrebitel (Multifunctional Frontline Fighter), a Soviet developmental project that never entered production. Scenarios pitted two F-15s against eight of these fighters, based on the BUR requirement to fight two major regional
conflicts simultaneously. According to Air Force models, the F-22 would establish air superiority in seven days while the F-15 needed 22–25 days—and only after experiencing 4.8 times the losses.33 In effect, the Air Force had defended the F-22 by using its own assumptions about future threats without addressing the GAO’s fundamental allegation—
the implausibility of the Air Force’s threat assumption. Further, the F-22 has demonstrated a capability to conduct air-to ground attack in high-threat environments where fourth-generation fighters simply cannot survive. Advanced surface-to-air-missile systems such as the Russian S-300 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] designations SA-10 and SA-20) are the deciding factor in these environments. The S-300, similar to the American Patriot surface-to-air missile, has been operational since 1980. Although no Middle Eastern country currently possesses S-300s, Iran has expressed interest, and both China and Russia have fielded large numbers of them. This system can engage fourth-generation fighters at ranges exceeding 100 miles.55 A single S-300 battalion has the potential to render F-15Es, F-16s,and F/A-18s incapable of striking targets within a circle approximately 200 miles across. additionally, the follow-on S-400 (NATO designation SA-21) further improves maximum engagement range. Fortunately, F-22s can utilize their stealth to operate effectively well inside the
maximum engagement ranges of these systems.57
However, F-22 performance is not without shortcomings, the two most substantial of which include limited range and high maintenance requirements. The aircraft’s maximum range is slightly superior to that of the F-16 but significantly inferior to that of the F-15C, which it was designed to replace.58 This fact has three important consequences: operational missions need more air-to-air tanker support, the F-22 has a limited ability to deeply penetrate hostile airspace, and pilots cannot take full advantage of the F-22’s supercruise capability. The aircraft has also proven more difficult to maintain than originally anticipated. The Air Force acknowledged that the F-22’s “radar-absorbing metallic skin is the principal cause of its maintenance troubles, with unexpected
shortcomings.”59 The service needs to maintain these coatings continuously to ensure the combat readiness of F-22s, thereby significantly increasing the necessary maintenance manpower (and cost). Moreover, even traditional (non-stealth-related) maintenance rates proved initially higher with the F-22 compared to those of older fighters. However, rates have improved vastly as maintenance personnel have acquired more experience. For example, the mean time between maintenance amounted to .97 flight hours in 2004, but that for newer F-22s has recently increased to 3.22 flight hours.60. For example, the F-22 will never have the capability of an air-to-ground platform like the A-10, F-15E, F-16, or F/A-18 in low-threat environments. Those fighters employ a much wider variety of air-to-ground munitions, can more easily incorporate emerging technologies (e.g., new-generation targeting pods), generally have greater range and loiter time, and are less expensive to procure and operate. These factors, combined with the absence of any airborne threat in Afghanistan, Iraq (since 2003), and Libya, largely explain why the F-22 did not participate in those conflicts.
The F-22 acquisition program adversely affected recapitalization of the fighter fleet in two ways. First, 187 F-22s cannot recapitalize the entire air superiority F-15 fleet as originally planned; F-15Cs will need to remain in service for many years to supplement the F-22s.72 Second, and more significantly, the Air Force delayed multirole, close air support, and SEAD fighter recapitalization during the F-22 acquisition. As a consequence, today’s average age for Air Force fighters is twice the historical norms, and the service will not field significant numbers of new fighter aircraft for many years. Could the Air Force have avoided this predicament? It missed two key opportunities. First, the Air Force could have delayed the start of EMD, reassessed ATF requirements, and modified the F-22 design to broaden its capabilities. Second, it could have acquired additional fourth-generation aircraft to mitigate developmental risk with the F-35.
Continuing Fourth-Generation Procurement Only a handful of fourth-generation F-15Es and F-16s were delivered after 1992, serving primarily to keep production lines open for future foreign Sales. The Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program ran concurrently with the F-22. Unlike the F-22, the F/A-18E/F was not designed to counter any specific threat. Rather, it addressed shortcomings of the original F/A-18, namely limited range and limited ability to carry unexpended ordnance back to the ship.88 This was a much less ambitious developmental program than the F-22, lacking stealth, supercruise, or thrust vectoring. Low developmental risk contributed to completion of the F/A-18E/F very nearly on time and on budget.89 As of 2008, the Navy’s total program cost amounted to $46.3 billion for 493 F/A-18E/Fs ($93.9 million per jet) while the Air Force’s total program cost came to $64.5 billion for 184 F-22s ($350.5 million per jet).90 In other words, the Navy
is buying 3.73 Super Hornets for the cost of a single F-22.
נערך לאחרונה ע"י strong1 בתאריך 03-01-2013 בשעה 19:26.
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16-06-2010, 23:18
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