09-04-2013, 16:51
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חבר מתאריך: 13.11.04
הודעות: 16,823
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אפרופו סיוע צבאי לישראל - קצת מידע מדו"חות ה GAO מלפני 20 שנה על פרשת "רמי דותן"
בתגובה להודעה מספר 1 שנכתבה על ידי דוד שמואל שמתחילה ב "ב2010 ישראל רכשה בארה"ב ציוד צבאי בסך 4 מיליארד $"
דו"ח ה GAO המתאר בפרוטרוט את השתלשלות פרשת רמי דותן מראשיתה בשנת 1985 ועד מעצרו של הקצין בסוף 1990
FOREIGN MILITARY AID
Diversion of U.S. Funds and Circumvention of U.S.Program Restrictions
http://www.legistorm.com/showFile/L...==/ful23661.pdf
Specifically, in the first instance, Pratt & Whitney and MOD representatives facilitated the diversion of $12.5 million of U.S. foreign military assistance funds through an overpricing scheme organized by former IAF Brigadier General Rami Dotan and others. The scheme involved two small Pratt & Whitney subcontractors-- Yrretco and Air Tech. Benjamin Sonnenschein operated the companies and transferred some of the companies' excessive profits to Yoram Ingbir, Sonnenschein's relative and a close associate of Dotan's. We could not determine what happened to these funds because we did not have access to records or individuals outside the United States. In 1986 and 1987, IAF officers and other Israelis directed Pratt & Whitney to award excessively overpriced subcontracts with predetermined prices to Yrretco and Air Tech . Upon receipt of Yrretco and Air Tech software and equipment, Pratt & Whitney forwarded the products to Israel without inspecting or testing the work. In return, Pratt & Whitney received a 45-percent markup on each subcontract. By Dotan's arrest in October 1990, Pratt & Whitney had paid almost $6.5 million to Yrretco and Air Tech although the work they had performed was worth less than $600,000.
We believe that MOD officials were aware of and facilitated these and the other briefly described transactions, which were exploited by Dotan's associates. On several occasions, Pratt & Whitney officials informed the MOD's Defense Mission in New York of the directed subcontracts involving Yrretco and Air Tech. Further, the MOD departed from its standard practice in issuing the $12.5- million worth of orders to finance the directed subcontracts. The orders either authorized or set prices fur the subcontracts that
were predetermined by Dotan, instead of being determined through price negotiations or set in accordance with Pratt & Whitney's standard U.S. government prices. Further, we believe that Pratt & Whitney should have known or strongly suspected that Government of Israel officials and other Israelis were diverting U.S. funds. It had numerous red flags that
the directed subcontracts to Yrretco and Air Tech were grossly overpriced and that those companies were closely tied to the IAF. Furthermore, the funding and management of the contracts departed from Pratt & Whitney's normal procedures.
The second set of transactions occurred in 1985, when Dotan encouraged Pratt & Whitney (Canada) to award two engineering service contracts worth $250,000 to Yoram Ingbir and his company, Ingbir Engineering. Pratt & Whitney has no clear idea what services were provided under these contracts. Pratt & Whitney failed to keep accurate books and records and, as a result, lost accountability of the money it paid to Ingbir and his company. The company, therefore, cannot independently support the invoices it
submitted to the Israeli Defense Mission for payment in U.S. funds. Because we were unable to determine what happened to the $250,000, or if the work paid for was accomplished, we do not know if a diversion of U.S. funds occurred.
In conclusion, we learned that the Israeli government had an indication of problems in the U.S.-financed program as early as 1987. Although the MOD investigated these and other allegations, significant new program controls were not established until 1990,
after receiving evidence that Dotan was accepting bribes. In the summer of 1993, DSAA issued a directive announcing the elimination of direct commercial contracts under the Foreign Military Assistance Program. DSAA would require that all subsequent funds
be allocated through Foreign Military Sales managed by U.S. agencies in an effort to provide better oversight. However, our investigation, along with a previous GAO review,4 indicates that Foreign Military Sales are also vulnerable to abuse. The review
concluded that U.S. government oversight of both Foreign Military Sales and direct commercial contracts is inadequate to ensure that effective oversight of subcontractors is provided, contractors actually provide the goods and services paid for, and sole-source
purchasing is justified.
ובעקבות פרשת רמי דותן ערך ה GAO דו"ח מקיף על תהליכי הרכש במסלול הישיר וה FMS הן של ישראל והן של מצרים כשתי הנהנות מתקציבי הסיוע הגדולים ביותר. הדו"ח מצא שאמנם יש מקום לרכישה במסלול הישיר (קרי מדינה מול ספק, שלא דרך הפנטגון) אולם מסלול זה חסר בקרות אפקטיביות ושקיפות, פגיע לשחיתות ולעתים (לא תמיד) אף גורם לתשלום יתר על פריטים מסוימים אותם היה ניתן לרכוש במחירי "ספק" בערוץ ה FMS, אם מהיצרנים ואם מתוך מלאי צבא ארה"ב. ה GAO ממליץ לבנות תהליכי בקרה ופיקוח קפדניים בהרבה בשני הצדדים כדי להבטיח שמקרים כמו פרשת רמי דותן לא יחזרו על עצמם... אגב כל המלל הזה היה טוב ויפה עד לפתיתת הברז בעקבות המלחמות בעירק ובאפגניסטן, שם נשפכו עשרות מיליארדים במסלולי אקספרס שונים על שירותי קבלן, רכישות מזורזות ועוד.
MILITARY SALES TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT
DOD Needs Stronger Controls Over U.S.-Financed Procurements
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat5/149746.pdf
נערך לאחרונה ע"י strong1 בתאריך 09-04-2013 בשעה 16:58.
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- והן מומקמות בחו"ל.... 
), לא יהיה זה הגיוני לנסות לרכוש ציוד "חוץ" שממילא יהיה יקר יותר מציוד מקביל תיקני אמריקאי.
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