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06-03-2013, 20:42
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חבר מתאריך: 13.11.04
הודעות: 16,823
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תמונת מצב - CV-22 אוספרי למבצעים מיוחדים של חהא"א - המון פרטים מעניינים
CV-22 Progress Report
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/...rogress-report/
Historically, two things define special operations air capability: an aircraft modified with special capability and crews selected from the conventional force for special training. The CV-22 is modified from the Marine version MV-22 by addition of terrain following, terrain avoidance radar, additional communications, added fuel tanks for range, and extra defensive systems for higher-threat air environments. At the end of 2011, about half of the CV-22s programmed to come to the U.S. Air Force and AFSOC had been delivered: five of seven for the CV-22 schoolhouse in the Training Command and 21 of 43 for AFSOC operational units. Two of AFSOC’s planned CV-22 squadrons, the 8th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) at Hurlburt Field, Fla., and the 20th SOS at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., have aircraft assigned to them and have both deployed operationally to exercises and to combat. It will be at least three more years before all of the aircraft are built and delivered to the four squadrons that are to possess and fly the aircraft.
Like other new AFSOC aircraft, the CV-22 deployed to combat as soon as it reached initial operational capability, or IOC, which was in 2009 with a deployment to Iraq. Since 2010, subsequent combat deployments have been to Afghanistan. Until 2011, there were not enough aircraft and trained people to sustain continuous deployment. Deployment schedules in 2011 were for a continuous deployment to begin in the spring, with the 20th SOS beginning it and turning it over after four months to the 8th SOS.
In late March, world events intervened into the schedule when Operation Odyssey Dawn called for CV-22s to deploy to Europe. The 20th SOS aborted its planned desert train-up time and moved out on a 96-hour deploy order, deploying in three days and 30 hours flying time to Royal Air Force Mildenhall, England, to join the 352nd Special Operations Group in support of the operation. Decisions by the NATO Alliance not to use SOF ground teams to help the Libyan rebels resulted in a decision for the 20th’s CV-22s to remain in Europe, and their planned train-up in the southwest United States became a European orientation to help accustom the people in the area around Mildenhall to the CV-22 – what it looks like, sounds like, and its flight profiles. This anticipates when the aircraft will be permanently assigned to Europe. The aircraft and crews completed their self-deployment to Afghanistan, after two days and 21 hours of flying time, to arrive at Kandahar on May 4.
Allowed to train unilaterally in the Afghan environment for a couple of weeks, the squadron began supporting operational missions later that month. Lt. Col. Tom Palenske, the squadron commander, relates that from May until the squadron was relieved by the 8th SOS in October, it flew 99 missions with a 99.6 percent success rate on providing the desired numbers of aircraft. The supported Army units captured or killed 307 enemy insurgents, and the Army units had only good things to say about the CV-22, the aircrews, and its maintainers.
“They like the speed of the aircraft, twice that of a helicopter, and that, like a helicopter, we aren’t limited to runways but can find LZs [landing zones] close to their targets.” The aircraft can range the entire area of operations in fairly short amounts of time; most targets are within 30 minutes of the launch point. Saved time can result in follow-on missions if target exploitation gains information on another target. Speed of action and speed of follow-on planning to another mission can result in greater success if the enemy has less time to communicate and react.
They’ve also dealt with the expected problems of brown-out/dust-out landings. Palenske related that the dust-outs are worse than in his helicopter experience, but the cockpit instrumentation and the stability of the CV-22 in a hover help to counter the negative effects
Criticisms of V-22 operational suitability and sustainability can now be answered more authoritatively as the numbers of aircraft have grown to a sizeable enough fleet. When the CV-22 fleet was less than a combined 10 aircraft at the training unit and at the first operational unit, the metrics were dismal. Operationally ready rates were around 60 percent and they decreased when the aircraft deployed to desert environments. With five or six deployed of the 20 aircraft in AFSOC in 2011, operational readiness numbers exceed 70 percent. Still, it’s short of the desired 80 percent, but closing in on that goal.
The CV-22 engine eats dust and digests it poorly. In the first month of Palenske’s operations in Afghanistan, the squadron changed every engine on every aircraft. The problem was serious enough to bring technicians from the engine maker, Rolls-Royce, to Afghanistan. They discovered a couple of things, changed a part, and brought some fixes on the engine programming software. They changed the procedures and water content used on engine washes, making the washes more effective at cleaning engine compressor sections. They installed new intakes for the oil coolers that kept them from clogging in the dust. Then, they loaded new software into the engine programs, allowing greater exhaust temperatures, increasing the aircraft’s airspeed by 20 knots and giving some altitude improvements.
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